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Abstract
Background A recent systematic review suggested that
drug registrations and onsite quality inspections may be
effective in reducing the prevalence of counterfeit and
substandard drugs. However, simply replicating the most
effective interventions is problematic, as it denotes
implementing the intervention without further adaptation.
Objective The aim was to systematically review the evi-
dence beyond effectiveness for systems-level interventions
to combat or prevent drug counterfeiting.
Methods We conducted an extensive search, including an
electronic search of 14 databases. We included studies
examining the efficiency, feasibility, reliability, and eco-
nomic outcomes of the interventions, as well as barriers
and facilitators to their implementation. Two reviewers
selected eligible studies and abstracted data in duplicate
and independently. We synthesized the results narratively,
stratified by type of intervention.
Results Of 10,220 captured citations, 19 met our inclusion
criteria. The findings suggest that the following may
strengthen regulatory measures (e.g., registration): mini-
mizing drug diversion, enhancing lines of communications,
ensuring feedback on drug quality, and promoting strict
licensing criteria. There is evidence that onsite quality
surveillance and inspection systems may be efficient and
cost-effective for preliminary testing of large samples of
drugs. Laws and legislation need to be specific to coun-
terfeit drugs, include firm penalties, address online pur-
chasing of drugs, and be complemented by education of
judges and lawyers. Public awareness and education should
rely on multiple platforms and comprehensive and dedi-
cated content. While product authentication technologies
may be efficient and reliable in detecting counterfeit drugs
in the supply chain, they require a strong information
system infrastructure. As for pharmacovigilance systems, it
is critical to tackle the issue of underreporting, to enhance
their chances of success.
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Conclusion Several factors are critical to the successful
design and implementation of systems-level interventions
to combat or prevent drug counterfeiting. Policymakers
need to take these into consideration to ensure success of
these interventions.
Key Points
Drug counterfeiting has serious public health and
safety implications; it is estimated that up to 15 % of
drugs sold worldwide are counterfeit, with the
percentage reaching up to 50 % in parts of Africa
and Asia.
We examined a range of systems-level interventions
to combat or prevent drug counterfeiting and found
some evidence on their efficiency, reliability, ability
to detect counterfeit drugs, cost-effectiveness,
acceptability, and/or implementation considerations.
Contextual factors are critical in shaping health
system decisions, and policymakers need to take
these into consideration to ensure effective
implementation and, ultimately, the success of
systems-level interventions to combat or prevent
drug counterfeiting.
1 Introduction
Drug counterfeiting is a widespread public health problem
that affects both developing and industrialized countries
[1, 2]. It is estimated that up to 15 % of drugs sold
worldwide are counterfeit [3]. In parts of Africa and Asia,
this percentage can reach up to 50 % [4].
There is no standardized definition for counterfeit drugs
[5]. The World Health Organization (WHO) defined a
counterfeit medicine as ‘‘one which is deliberately and
fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity and/or
source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and
generic products and counterfeit products may include
products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong
ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient
active ingredient or with fake packaging’’ [6]. The term
‘‘falsified’’ is increasingly being used in place of ‘‘coun-
terfeit’’ to avoid debates over intellectual property rights
[7].
The spread of counterfeit drugs is evident in countries
that have weak legislative and enforcement bodies and
where the manufacture, importation, distribution, supply,
and sale of drugs are poorly regulated [1]. Internet pur-
chasing of pharmaceuticals has further contributed to the
explosive growth in counterfeit medications [8, 9]. A
recent report by the National Association of Boards of
Pharmacy (NABP) found that the majority of web sites
offering prescription-only medications for sale were not
compliant with either federal or state laws, or with industry
standards [10]. Similarly, the WHO suggests that drugs
purchased online from sites that conceal their physical
address are counterfeit over 50 % of the time [11].
Counterfeited medications can promote drug resistance
and lead to treatment failures as well as contribute to
morbidity and mortality [12]. They can also lead to loss of
public confidence not only in medicine, but also in public
health. In addition, they can undermine the reputation of
drug companies, which is why some companies may be
hesitant to announce incidents of counterfeiting of their
products [13].
The need to identify effective anti-counterfeiting
strategies has been raised as a main policy concern by
policymakers from low- and middle-income countries,
including those in the Eastern Mediterranean region [14]. A
recent effectiveness review found positive effects of drug
registrations, WHO prequalification of drugs, and onsite
quality inspections and surveillance systems (which con-
stituted key components of multi-faceted interventions) in
reducing the prevalence of counterfeit and substandard
drugs [15]. However, simply replicating the most effica-
cious and effective interventions is problematic, as it
denotes disseminating the intervention without further
adaptation, and is thus unlikely to succeed [16]. Under-
standing how systems-level interventions work and the
contextual evidence is critical in shaping health system
decisions, and failure to consider these factors can
adversely affect the implementation and, ultimately, the
success of interventions [17–19]. Thus, the objective of this
study was to systematically review the evidence beyond
effectiveness for systems-level interventions to combat or
prevent drug counterfeiting. We specifically focused on
studies that examined the efficiency, feasibility, reliability,
and/or economic outcomes of the interventions, as well as
barriers and facilitators to their implementation.
2 Methods
2.1 Protocol and Registration
We registered the protocol in PROSPERO, an international
prospective register of systematic reviews (CRD4201400
9269) [20].
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2.2 Eligibility Criteria
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were:
• Types of studies: We included non-randomized studies
(prospective, retrospective, pre-post, cross-sectional
studies), descriptive case studies, qualitative studies,
economic studies, and process evaluation studies on
counterfeit drugs. We included both published and
unpublished studies.
• We excluded reviews, editorials, commentaries, letters
to the editors, reflections, proposals, and studies
published in abstract format only. We also excluded
studies not published in English, Arabic, or French.
• Problem: Counterfeit/spurious/falsely labeled/falsified/
medicines. Counterfeit medicines were defined accord-
ing to the WHO classification [21]. These include
medicines with wrong active ingredients, no active
ingredients, high levels of impurities, insufficient active
ingredients, or fake packaging of drugs. Although the
main focus of the review is on counterfeit drugs, we
also included substandard drugs when a study failed to
distinguish between the two, or if it was not clear
whether the poor-quality drug was counterfeit or
substandard.
• We did not limit the review to any specific class of
therapeutic drug. We excluded studies that focused on
herbal medicines/dietary supplements/cosmetics/food
products.
• Types of interventions: We included any intervention at
the health system level to combat or prevent drug
counterfeiting (see framework in Fig. 1, developed by
El-Jardali et al. [15]). The interventions included
national anti-counterfeit drug laws and legislation,
registration and licensing, inspection and quality con-
trol, training of personnel, price control, technological
interventions (e.g., product authentication technology),
national alert systems, and education and awareness
campaigns.
• We excluded studies that tackled proposed interven-
tions or strategies. We also excluded studies that
focused on interventions at the hospital level to
improve medication administration processes or reduce
medication errors. In addition, we excluded studies that
focused on analytical techniques not implemented at
the systems level (e.g., spectroscopic techniques).
• Type of outcome measures: Outcomes included effi-
ciency of intervention, feasibility of intervention,
reliability of intervention, execution time, population
coverage, regulatory visibility, detection of counterfeit
drugs, economic outcome (cost and cost-effectiveness),
implementation-related factors (barriers, facilitators,
gaps, and loopholes, etc.), and acceptability by end
users.
We did not limit our review to any specific type of
setting or date of publication.
2.3 Literature Search
We searched the following electronic databases: MED-
LINE, PubMed, EMBASE, Rx for Change, Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL),
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature
(CINAHL), Global Health Library, Health Systems Evi-
dence, Cab Direct, and Academic Search Complete.
We also searched the grey literature using Google
Scholar, Mednar, Greylit Network, and Opengrey. In
addition, we searched relevant websites such as the WHO,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the United
States Pharmacopeia (USP). We screened the reference
lists of the included papers and other relevant papers and
reviews.
We developed and validated the search strategy with the
information specialist at the American University of Beirut.
The search combined various terms for counterfeit drugs
and included both controlled vocabulary terms such as
MeSH (Medical Subject Headings) and free-text words.
We did not use any language, study design, or date
restriction. The full search strategy is provided in Elec-
tronic Supplementary Material 1.
2.4 Selection Process
Two reviewers (RF and FA) independently screened the
title and abstract of identified citations for potential eligi-
bility. We retrieved the full text for studies judged as
potentially eligible by at least one of the two reviewers.
The two reviewers then screened the full texts in duplicate
and independently for eligibility. They used a standardized
and pilot-tested screening form. They resolved disagree-
ments by discussion or with the help of a third reviewer.
We conducted a calibration exercise to ensure validity
of the selection process.
2.5 Data Abstraction Process
Two reviewers (FA and HA) abstracted data from eligible
studies in duplicate and independently. They used a stan-
dardized data abstraction form to collect data on funding,
study design, context (country and timeframe), intervention,
and reported outcomes and results. Disagreements were
resolved by discussion or with the help of a third reviewer.
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We did not encounter multiple reports of the same study
or multiple studies in one report.
2.6 Data Analysis and Synthesis
Given the qualitative nature of the data, we synthesized and
reported the results narratively. We stratified the results
based on the type of interventions being considered. The
stratification was guided by the conceptual framework
developed by El-Jardali et al. for the different anti-coun-
terfeit drug strategies (Fig. 1).
3 Results
3.1 Search Results
Figure 2 shows the study flowchart. Of the 10,220 citations
identified through database and website searches, 19 met
our inclusion criteria. No additional study was identified
through screening the reference lists of the included stud-
ies. We excluded 41 studies at full-text screening for the
following reasons: study not in English, French or Arabic
(n = 3), not a primary research or country case study
(n = 9), not about interventions to combat or prevent drug
counterfeiting (n = 5), not a systems-level intervention
(n = 7), does not assess outcome of interest (n = 9), does
not assess ‘‘implemented’’ interventions (n = 7), and
prevalence study (n = 1) (see Electronic Supplementary
Material 2 for details).
The characteristics of the 19 included studies are shown
in Electronic Supplementary Material 3. The majority of
studies were country case studies (n = 9), followed by
surveys (n = 4), mixed methods (n = 3), qualitative
studies (n = 1), prospective audits (n = 1), and application
of online algorithms (n = 1). With the exception of one
French study [22], all other studies were reported in the
English language. Three studies included multiple coun-
tries [10, 23, 24], one focused on online platforms [25],
whereas the remaining 15 encompassed the following
countries: Belgium and Greece (n = 1), Germany (n = 1),
Mali and Mauritania (n = 1), South Africa (n = 1), Hong
Kong (n = 1), China (n = 1), Tanzania (n = 1), Turkey
(n = 1), Sweden (n = 1), the USA (n = 2), Burkina Faso
(n = 1), the Philippines (n = 1), Nigeria (n = 1), and
Kenya (n = 1). The multicountry reports aggregated the
data from the different countries and analyzed them col-
lectively to draw generic recommendations.
The included studies examined various types of inter-
ventions. These included drug regulatory measures (e.g.,
registration) and establishment of drug regulatory authori-
ties (n = 3), onsite inspection and surveillance systems
(n = 2), drug laws, legislation and decrees (n = 6), pro-
duct authentication technology (n = 3), pharmacovigilance
systems (n = 5), public awareness and education (n = 2),
and recursive trust labeling for detecting fake medical web
sites (n = 1). The types of outcomes assessed included
efficiency, reliability, cost, cost-effectiveness, population
coverage, regulatory visibility, acceptability by end user,
ability to detect counterfeit drugs, and implementation-
Fig. 1 A framework for the different anti-counterfeit drug strategies This framework was adopted from the study by El-Jardali et al. [15]
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related factors (e.g., barriers, facilitators, gaps, etc.). All
studies reported more than one type of outcome.
3.2 Findings by Intervention
We provide a summary of the findings of each included
study in Electronic Supplementary Material 3. We also
provide below a narrative synthesis of the findings, strati-
fied by type of intervention.
3.2.1 Drug Regulatory Measures
We identified one study that focused on regulatory mea-
sures [26] and two that focused on the establishment of
drug regulatory authorities at the national level [10, 27].
The studies aimed to examine the components of drug
regulatory systems that constrained or facilitated the
effectiveness of drug regulation. Some of the key high-
lighted issues hampering regulatory effectiveness related
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Fig. 2 Flowchart for selection of the studies
Systems-Level Interventions to Combat or Prevent Drug Counterfeiting 267
to drug diversion; communication gaps; a lack of ade-
quate funds; shortages of qualified staff and equipment;
the absence of a central drug regulatory authority; weak
coordination, monitoring, and control; a lack of stan-
dardized regulatory tools and criteria; and the presence of
regulatory double standards with respect to the different
drug regulatory functions. None of the included studies
highlighted any measures taken and their results in
overcoming the factors hampering regulatory
effectiveness.
The study conducted in South Africa included registra-
tion, licensing, and auditing of drugs and suppliers as key
regulatory measures of the quality assurance system under
the Medicines Control Council [26]. Semi-structured
interviews with key stakeholders pointed to several factors
that may hinder proper implementation of the abovemen-
tioned system. These included diversion of state medicines
to the private sector, which affects distribution of medici-
nes within the state sector; poor communication between
manufacturers, regulatory authorities, and providers; the
absence of feedback on complaints received on drug
quality; and the ambiguity of criteria for licensing, which
results in incompetent individuals operating as wholesalers.
When asked about key strategies employed to protect drug
quality, participants highlighted purchasing registered
drugs from licensed suppliers, audits between manufacturer
and distributor and/or provider, and use of standard oper-
ating procedures.
The multicountry study conducted by the WHO exam-
ined the experience of ten selected countries that have drug
regulatory authorities [10]. Several phenomena impeding
regulatory effectiveness were observed among the different
countries. These included: (1) fragmentation of drug reg-
ulatory responsibilities, which could result in lapses in
implementation with increased risk of duplication of efforts
and wastage of resources; (2) delegation of drug regulatory
powers in the form of either delegation with full authority
but without coordination, or delegation without authority
and accountability; (3) assignment of multiple functions to
drug regulatory authorities with potential for conflicts of
interest arising in respect to mandates and resource allo-
cation; (4) regulatory double standards in which exemp-
tions are sometimes made, depending on where the drug
comes from, who manufactured it, or where it is dis-
tributed; (5) the lack of availability of regulatory tools such
as documented guidelines and checklists for inspection
among all drug regulatory authorities; (6) shortages of
qualified personnel; (7) the absence of adequate and sus-
tainable financing mechanisms; and (8) the lack of balance
of priorities whereby different drug regulatory functions
receive varying degrees of emphasis (e.g., formal vs.
informal sector inspection and pre-marketing vs. post-
marketing product assessment).
In Nigeria, the task forces on counterfeit drugs have
been able to make a few seizures of some counterfeit
medicines; however, they were rated as ineffective as a
result of corruption, communication gaps, a lack of suffi-
cient funding, shortages of human and material resources,
and inadequate training of task force personnel. Further-
more, respondents regarded the coordination, monitoring,
and control by the task forces as deficient [27]. Some of the
key recommendations for improvement included control of
the task forces by one agency, centralization of state and
federal task forces, exclusion of military officers from
joining task forces, exclusivity of membership to pharma-
cists, identification and dismissal of corrupt military offi-
cers, destruction of seized products (rather than allowing
them to go into circulation), provision of sufficient funding,
equipment and trained human resources, and adequate
security for non-military members.
3.2.2 Onsite Quality Surveillance and Inspection Systems
We identified two country case studies that focused on this
component [28, 29]. Both studies provided evidence that
onsite quality surveillance and inspection systems may be
efficient and cost-effective tools for preliminary field test-
ing of large samples of drugs.
The first case study focused on the pilot project that took
place in Tanzania for a year and a half on the use of
Minilab kits, which are thin-layer chromatography (TLC)-
based drug quality testing techniques [29]. The program
intended to improve the testing capacity of inspectors sta-
tioned at key ports of entry to screen the quality of
imported medicines as well as three non-ports-of-entry
centers to screen drugs collected during post-marketing
surveillance. The use of Minilab for quality screening was
inexpensive, provided a high sample throughput, and
required simple training and minimal resources for sus-
tainability. The initial cost per kit was low, at US$5000 per
kit. The cost of processing samples was also low at US$1.5
per sample, with no maintenance costs. Since the launch of
the program, 1257 drug samples have been tested outside
the central quality control laboratory, almost doubling the
previous testing capacity. The large number of samples
screened rendered the use of Minilab as cost-effective and
contributed to the increased regulatory reach and visibility
throughout the country. Despite the increased number of
samples that have been tested, only five counterfeit prod-
ucts were detected. In addition, 46 batches (3.7 %) failed
the USP dissolution test. The authors attributed these low
numbers to the fact that the Minilab kit can only reliably
detect ‘‘grossly’’ substandard or ‘‘wrong’’ drug samples,
and therefore should be used in conjunction with full-ser-
vice quality control. Also, reliability of detection depends
on the operator’s visual perception, though the latter can be
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minimized by adopting approaches that improve inspec-
tors’ testing competence and reliability in screening
samples.
The second study focused on the mobile laboratory
quality inspection system implemented by the Chinese
National Institute for the Control of Pharmaceutical and
Biological Products for onsite quality testing and extension
of drug surveillance to remote countrysides [28]. The
mobile laboratories offered in-time data collection,
increased the efficiency of the drug surveillance program,
expanded the monitoring area, and strengthened the capa-
bility of regulatory authorities to timely respond to evi-
dence of adverse reactions related to drug products on the
market. The near-infrared spectra (NIR)-based quick
screening method demonstrated high reliability, where all
329 batches known to be counterfeit failed screening. In
addition, following a toxic incident by diethylene glycol
that caused 11 deaths, the mobile labs were sent out to
screen all suspected drugs still on the market. All drugs
screened positive for diethylene glycol by the mobile labs
were later verified by gas chromatography. The mobile labs
also reduced costs whereby only suspected batches (rather
than the all batches) were sent to a district laboratory for
further testing. By comparing the average analysis cost per
batch of drugs using the traditional district lab versus the
targeted mobile lab, the authors estimated that the system
reduced the cost of analysis in the district laboratories by
about 90 %. The authors highlighted some implementation
considerations, such as the mobile laboratory requiring
dedicated software to allow access to information and
provide automatic analysis of the NIR, which may con-
stitute a challenge to some developing countries that lack
resources.
3.2.3 Drug Laws, Legislation, and Decrees
Six studies aimed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of
laws and legislation addressing the problem of counterfeit
and falsified drugs in different countries [10, 27, 30–32].
One of the studies focused specifically on laws and legis-
lation pertaining to online pharmacies and online purchasing
of drugs [24]. Key highlighted weaknesses across studies
included the absence of counterfeit drug-specific laws and
legislation, the lack of legal statutes for online sale of drugs,
an insufficient legal and administrative framework to crim-
inalize fraudulent falsification of medicines, and poor
enforcement capacity for proper implementation and
enforcement of laws. None of the included studies high-
lighted any measures taken and their results in overcoming
the factors hampering legal effectiveness.
In Nigeria, the laws governing the manufacture, sale,
distribution, importation, and exportation of drugs were not
sufficient to control the illegal manufacture and sale of
drugs. In addition, the implementation and enforcement of
the various drug laws were highlighted as deficient [27].
In Hong Kong, the existing legislative system pertaining
to falsified drugs has led to an increase in the quantity of
counterfeit drugs seized at the retail level over recent years,
amounting to US$98,625.45 in 2008 [30]; nonetheless,
several weaknesses were identified by key stakeholders,
including the absence of counterfeit drug-specific legisla-
tion, the presence of penalties that do not address the
underlying public health impact of drug counterfeiting,
light penalties (highest penalty was a fine of US$1290), and
insufficient public health awareness and education of jud-
ges, lawyers, and prosecutors, who might feel bound by the
existing commercial legislation. In Kenya, the anti-coun-
terfeit act focused on intellectual property and failed to
make a significant distinction between falsified medica-
tions and quality-assured generic medications, leading to
its eventual suspension [32].
The WHO multicountry study provided an overview of
legislation pertaining to drugs in general without neces-
sarily focusing on anti-counterfeit drug-specific legislation
[10]. It was found that in many countries, drug legislation
did not encompass all products with medicinal claims and
all activities related to the manufacture, importation, dis-
tribution, dispensing, and promotion of drugs in both the
public and the private sector. In addition, they did not
clarify the roles, responsibilities, and relationships between
the different entities involved in drug regulation, nor did
they specify the regulatory tools, standards of operation,
and consequences of poor performance. The abovemen-
tioned gaps could in turn undermine the effectiveness of
drug legislation.
In Florida, the Prescription Drug Protection Act of 2003
had been billed as the toughest anti-counterfeit drug
wholesale law in the country as it imposed considerable
credentialing requirements and the use of pedigree papers
for all prescription drugs subject to wholesaling or dis-
pensing in Florida [31]. Nonetheless, several loopholes
were identified, including the fact that wholesalers with
‘‘suspicious’’ backgrounds could still obtain a permit by
listing another person on an application; administrative
oversight that placed more emphasis on meeting timelines
for processing applications and issuing permits than on
closely scrutinizing the responses in the application forms;
the restriction of pedigree paper use to only 34 selected
drugs; and failure to verify or authenticate pedigree papers,
or in some cases, circulation of inaccurate pedigree papers
by wholesalers. Subsequent enactment of House Bill HB
371 in 2006 has resulted in the elimination of the pedigree
paper trail in many types of drug transactions, further
weakening the full scope of Florida’s drug pedigree laws.
A survey of 114 countries by the WHO Global Obser-
vatory for e-Health examined the challenges and advances
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of member states concerning safety and security on the
Internet [24]. Specifically, 66 % of the countries responded
that they lacked any legislation pertaining to online phar-
macy operations. Where such legislation existed, it was
more prominent in developed countries and prohibited
Internet pharmacy operation more often than allowed it (19
vs. 7 %, respectively). In addition, the majority of coun-
tries (86 %) reported that they did not regulate, accredit, or
certify online pharmacy sites. Regarding the regulation of
online purchasing of drugs from abroad, 75 % of countries
reported having no legislation permitting or prohibiting the
practice. Almost 80 % said they ‘‘do not have, do not
know, or did not respond’’ if there were consequences for
breaching laws regulating the online purchasing of drugs.
The findings highlighted the need for stronger governance
mechanisms to promote the creation of political and legal
frameworks for the online sale of drugs.
3.2.4 Product Authentication Systems
Three studies assessed the reliability, efficiency, usability,
and/or cost-effectiveness of product authentication tech-
nologies in fighting drug counterfeiting [33–35].
Simoens examined the reliability, efficacy, and cost-ef-
fectiveness of a patient safety communication service that
is based on mass serialization technology (a method of
assigning a unique number to each drug package) at the
level of dispensing in Greek and Belgian communities [33].
A prospective mystery shopping audit of hypothetical test
codes conducted in a sample of 116 Belgian community
pharmacies showed 100 % reliability, where actual
responses provided by the service corresponded with the
correct responses as derived from the authentication data-
base. Of the 220,751 scans tested during June–August 2008
in Belgium, the service identified 212,205 scans relating to
authentic products (96.13 % of scans), 1635 scans relating
to recalled product (0.74 %), 6630 scans relating to prod-
ucts that may be recalled (3 %), and 281 scans relating to
expired products (0.13 %). No scans relating to suspicious
products were identified. Similar results were observed in
Greece (see Electronic Supplementary Material 3). The
authors conducted a modeling exercise for a hypothetical
country using the assumptions of five pharmacy software
providers covering 10,000 pharmacies that dispense 400
million packs per year. Costs included start-up costs and
annual running costs whereas benefits originated from
identifying recalled, expired, or suspicious products. The
modeling exercise showed that an authentication service
would become cost-neutral in a scenario where 0.47 % of
products per year are identified as recalled or expired. The
total benefit of an authentication service was estimated at
US$8,535,749 for Belgium, US$4,896,476 for Greece, and
US$6,753,608 for the cost-neutral scenario per year. The
pre-requisites for such a system are the availability of the
necessary information systems in pharmacies to run the
service and the display of unique serialized numbers on
reimbursable drugs.
Another pilot project implemented in Sweden focused
on the reliability and user friendliness of a 2-D matrix
product verification system at the level of dispensing [34].
Feedback provided by the pharmacists participating in the
survey showed that a large majority (more than 90 %)
found the system easy or very easy to use. About 85 %
rated the system’s response time as ‘‘generally fast’’ or
‘‘consistently fast’’. On the other hand, it was reported that
the presence of more than one code on the package caused
confusion for the user and minimized its acceptance.
Although the system was capable of identifying an illicit
product before being dispensed to the patient, it could not
be used for automatic identification of the entry point of a
suspect product into the legitimate supply chain. Also,
reliability was dependent on the quality of the existing
information system and the sustained readability of the data
carrier used.
Similarly, a case study conducted in Turkey by Altun-
kan et al. discussed the track-and-trace system imple-
mented in the pharmacy sector [35]. The system was
reported to ensure reliable supply of drugs to patients and
prevent the sale of spurious/counterfeit drugs and barcode
scams. However, empirical data were not provided to
support this claim. The system was also reported to detect
harmful drugs within a very short period of time (seconds)
compared with the older procedure, as well as to promote
smooth communication among stakeholders. The authors
highlighted the importance of the Data Matrix (which acted
as a data carrier) in ensuring that every single step and
action of a particular unit in the supply chain can be traced
via web services, thus allowing single identification at a
time and ensuring high accuracy and security at a relatively
lower price compared with radio frequency identification
(RFID) tags.
3.2.5 Pharmacovigilance Systems
Five case studies focusing on pharmacovigilance systems
defined these as a reporting system that seeks to detect
cases of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) and investigate
their causes, be it a counterfeit drug or a medication error,
retroactively [23, 32, 36–38]. The systems have been suc-
cessful in detecting a host of drug-related problems,
including a lack of active ingredients, an absence of clin-
ical effects, adulterated content, and contaminations.
Nonetheless, a number of barriers and facilitators to their
implementation have been highlighted.
In Burkina Faso, Kabore et al. indicated that the formal
pharmacovigilance system launched by the Ministry of
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Health enhanced the reporting of ADRs and accounted for
most of the reports sent to the National Drug Authority in
2010 [37]. While the data collected have not led to the
identification of local drug-related risks, relevant drug
safety alerts from external sources have been monitored
and acted upon. In 2010, 31 marketing authorizations were
modified to include new safety information, while seven
others were suspended and the corresponding drugs with-
drawn from the national market. The study also stated
some advantages to implementing such a system, such as
its ease of operation, relatively low cost, high coverage,
lifecycle follow-up of medicines, non-interference with
prescribing habits, and ability to allow follow-up studies.
Olsson et al. provided an overview of the status of
pharmacovigilance systems in 55 low- and middle-income
countries [23]. The authors found that in 40 countries, the
system captured events related to an unexpected lack of
efficacy, due to counterfeiting, quality defects, antibiotic
resistance, irrational drug use, and/or inadequate quality of
patient care [23]. Seven countries also had sentinel sites to
monitor HIV/AIDS patients and other special groups. The
number of individual case reports received by the phar-
macovigilance programs in 2007 was less than 1000 for the
majority of countries (72 %), whereas it exceeded 10,000
in Mexico, Singapore, and Thailand. The information
gathered through pharmacovigilance activities were mostly
used to assist regulatory functions (88 %, n = 42 coun-
tries) and have resulted in changes in product information
(n = 21 countries), safety warnings (n = 24), and market
withdrawals (n = 20).
In the Philippines, the pharmacovigilance system pro-
vided a way to detect substandard and counterfeit drugs
should they pass regulatory inspections, with subsequent
identification of a range of problems [38]. These included
Chinese ‘‘DeWitts’ Kidney and Bladder Pills’’ for patients
with renal diseases that were found to contain wrong and
harmful ingredients, health supplements claiming to be
natural in origin, hazardous weight-reducing products
imported illegally into the country, and steroid compound
and phenylbutazone adulterating Chinese herbal products.
The system has also resulted in warnings and health
advisories to health professionals and the public.
In Kenya, Cohn et al. described an incident related to the
identification of falsified antiretroviral drugs in the supplies
of the Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) projects [32].
Nurses working in an MSF-supported HIV/AIDS treatment
program found two discolored and molding batches of
Zidolam-N. The affected batches were immediately iso-
lated and sent back to the distributor. At the same time, the
pharmacovigilance department of the Kenya Pharmacy and
Poisons Board (KPPB), the drug regulatory agency for
Kenya, and the WHO Pre-Qualification Program were
notified of the quality problem, leading to a series of
investigations. Within 3 months of detecting the falsified
drugs in the MSF supply chain, around 95 % of patients
who had taken the drug had returned to an MSF clinic for
medical review and medication replacement. Some of the
highlighted factors that may have hindered the respon-
siveness and process of investigation related to the fact that
the KPPB did not immediately issue any public informa-
tion on the incident, with no official public communication
from the government until several weeks after the incident
had occurred. In addition, the KPPB communication did
not include information beyond the initial WHO alert or
issue a clear product recall.
In the USA, the ‘‘forensic’’ pharmacovigilance system
resulted in the discovery and investigation of ADRs caused
by contaminated heparin in 2008 [36]. Specifically, a case
study of a severe allergic-type reaction to heparin occurred
in patients treated with hemodialysis at a single pediatric
hospital and was identified by both the manufacturer and
the National Regulatory Authority. The series of rapid
investigations that ensued revealed the presence of a con-
taminant in samples of heparin crude materials, heparin
active pharmaceutical ingredients, and final heparin drug
products. This led to national alerts and calls for immediate
withdrawal of the product from the US market. The issue
was contained in the USA within a period of 4 months.
However, a total of 785 adverse reaction reports, including
81 deaths, were associated with the contamination.
Several barriers to proper functioning of pharmacovig-
ilance systems have been highlighted. All included studies
pinpointed underreporting as a major obstacle. Hindrances
to underreporting included a low level of awareness and
recognition among patients and healthcare providers
regarding counterfeit drugs and adverse drug events,
adverse events being misinterpreted as part of the healing
process, ignorance of the reporting requirements, the
availability and accessibility of reporting forms, and fear of
litigation and being held accountable for the ADR [23, 37].
Other factors limiting the development of pharmacovigi-
lance in low- and middle-income countries included the
lack of national guidelines and standardized operating
procedures on pharmacovigilance, insufficient coordination
and networking of pharmacovigilance stakeholders
throughout the country, no specific legislation on phar-
macovigilance, a lack of staff trained in pharmacovigi-
lance, and insufficient funding to ensure sustainability of
newly developed systems [23, 37]. In Burkina Faso, the
system achieved a performance score of 70 %; some of the
main weaknesses identified pertained to the absence of
specific laws pertaining to pharmacovigilance, the lack of
national guidelines and standard operating procedures on
pharmacovigilance, and inadequate coordination among
pharmacovigilance stakeholders. In addition, the reporting
form designed by the national drug authority takes ADRs
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and medication errors into account, but does not include
treatment failure or pharmaceutical product quality [37].
Several suggestions have been provided to facilitate the
implementation of such systems. These included raising the
level of awareness among healthcare providers; integration
of pharmacovigilance into undergraduate, postgraduate,
and health professional curricula; formalization of phar-
macovigilance structures and activities within hospitals and
public health programs; and establishment of a ‘‘reporting
culture’’ in healthcare practitioners [37]. Methods to
encourage reporting include the use of continuing medical
education credits for medical professionals, active dis-
semination of reporting forms to all facilities where
potential reporters are practicing, and provision of indi-
vidual acknowledgement letters to reporters whenever a
report has been received [23]. Additional facilitators
included pooling of adverse event data from countries into
one large database, such as VigiBase, to help increase
sensitivity and specificity of detection as well as support
analysis strategies [36]. The extension of regulatory
authorities’ communication activities, development of
newsletters and web sites, and active engagement with
media to provide the public with updated safety informa-
tion have also been highlighted as relevant [23]. Impor-
tantly, governments should take a leadership role to
‘‘propel’’ pharmacovigilance towards the goal of ensuring
drug safety as well as provide the needed policy and reg-
ulatory framework and funding [23].
3.2.6 Public Awareness and Education on Counterfeit
Drugs
We identified two eligible studies that focused on educat-
ing and raising awareness on counterfeit drugs from illicit
drug outlets.
The French study by Cuchet-Chosseler et al. examined a
public awareness campaign (mainly poster based) on coun-
terfeit street medicines in Mali and Mauritania [22]. A
survey was used to measure the exposure of school students
to the posters as well as assess the overall efficiency and
efficacy of the campaign. Eighty-four percent of students
reported hearing about the dangers of drugs on the streets. In
addition, 61 % reported seeing the posters in pharmacies;
however, only 41 % recalled what it was about. Those who
had seen the posters and heard about the dangers were more
likely to indicate a need for better control of illicit drug
outlets. Overall, the campaign partially increased the
knowledge of participants regarding the danger of illicit
drug outlets, with inconsistent results observed for opinions
and behaviors. Some highlighted areas for improvement
included the utilization of broader sets of media channels
(e.g., TV), the distribution of posters in more public places,
better elaboration on prices of drugs as part of the key
messages (to contest the commonly held belief that street
drugs are cheaper, thus more appealing), and the integration
of courses on this topic in the school curriculum. Future
campaigns could also recruit trainers to design and monitor
the contents of key messages to ensure proper conveyance of
the messages to target audience without distortions.
Thomson et al. examined whether online awareness and
education about counterfeit drugs could reach the target
audience and influence counterfeit medicine purchasing
behaviors [39]. The authors developed an imitation online
pharmacy that aimed at directly engaging and warning those
at risk from fake drugs once accessed. The online pharmacy
was heavily promoted for 9 months. Eighty-five percent of
individuals searching for online pharmacies visited the
website within this period, yielding a total of 360,532 visi-
tors. These included 182,602 unique visits to the landing
page, which displayed a warning about the danger of illegal
online pharmacies, 142,676 visits to the key warning page,
and 16,378 visits to extra advice and information. In addi-
tion, 12,227 unique visitors clicked through the link direct-
ing them to the German Institute of Medical Documentation
and Information (DIMDI) that listed legitimate online/high
street pharmacies. The findings indicated that the key mes-
sages reached the targeted audience as well as supported the
potential for change in consumer behaviors once awareness
on how to buy safely is raised.
3.2.7 Recursive Trust Labeling
One study examined the efficacy of an adaptive learning
algorithm called recursive trust labeling (RTL), which
makes use of underlying graph-based and content classi-
fiers, combined with a recursive labeling mechanism, for
better detection of fake medical web sites [25]. The method
was evaluated on a test bed covering approximately 100
million links between 930,000 web sites, including 1000
known legitimate and fake medical sites. Analysis of the
performance results showed that RTL attained over 90 %
accuracy in its detection capabilities on all three test bed
subsets (online pharmacy, health information, and medical
institution web sites). The findings demonstrated the via-
bility of RTL in detecting fake medical web sites. More-
over, robustness analysis showed that it was able to attain
high performance levels even when the dataset consisted of
as little as 30 web sites.
4 Discussion
4.1 Summary and Interpretation of Findings
Overall, we identified 19 studies providing evidence
beyond effectiveness for systems-level interventions to
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prevent or combat drug counterfeiting. The findings high-
lighted several factors that are critical to the successful
design and implementation of systems-level interventions
to combat or prevent drug counterfeiting.
In the previous effectiveness review, regulatory mea-
sures (e.g., registration and WHO prequalification of
drugs), and onsite quality inspections (which constituted
key components of multifaceted interventions) were
suggested as effective measures in reducing the preva-
lence of counterfeit and substandard drugs [15]. In this
review, we identified three studies that focused on regu-
latory measures and two that focused on onsite quality
inspections and surveillance systems. The findings sug-
gest that the implementation of regulatory measures
should be complemented by efforts to minimize drug
diversion; strengthen communication between manufac-
turers, providers, and regulatory authorities; ensure
feedback on drug quality complaints post-registration;
and promote unambiguity and strict criteria for licensing
of wholesalers. Importantly, a central drug regulatory
authority should be accountable for the overall effec-
tiveness of drug regulation. The action taken by the reg-
ulatory authority should cover all drug regulatory
functions in a balanced fashion and encompass both the
formal and informal sector (given the prominence of drug
counterfeiting in the latter sector). In addition, adequate
and sustainable funding should be made available, per-
sonnel of integrity who are appropriately trained and
qualified should be recruited, and appropriate standards
and guidelines should be developed and used as tools for
application of all regulatory processes. Finally, the regu-
latory process should be monitored and evaluated to
identify emerging problems and ensure that the actual
activities are meeting the established objectives.
Similarly, we found some evidence that the use of onsite
quality surveillance and inspection systems could offer
regulators in limited-resource settings with an efficient and
cost-effective tool for preliminary testing of large samples
of drugs as well as increase regulatory reach and visibility
throughout the country. Two systems have been imple-
mented; the Minilab kit, which relies on TLC [29], and the
mobile lab that uses near-infrared spectroscopy as the main
screening tool in addition to other equipment such as TLC,
visible microscopy, and test kits for specific chemical
reactions [28]. Although TLC is relatively less expensive
(costing between US$5000–10,000 for a fully equipped kit)
[29, 40], a drawback is that it can only reliably detect
highly manipulated drugs, which might result in missing
slightly substandard drugs. Nonetheless, it is recommended
that both Minilab kits and mobile labs be used in con-
junction with a full-service quality control laboratory
capable of auditing and verifying reported substandard and
counterfeit results.
With regard to drug laws and legislation, the findings
from one study suggest that these could contribute to an
increased amount of counterfeit drugs being detected at the
retail level [30]. However, to enhance their success, laws
and legislation need to be specific to counterfeit drugs,
focus on public health rather than the intellectual property
perspective, address the entire illicit online pharmacy
ecosystem, include a sufficient legal and administrative
framework to criminalize fraudulent falsification, and be
complemented by strong enforcement capacity as well as
education of judges, lawyers, and the public.
Although product authentication systems such as track
and trace and RFID are increasingly being promoted as
preventive measures against drug counterfeiting [41, 42],
there is no evidence on their effectiveness in reducing the
prevalence of counterfeit drugs. The studies we identified
suggested that product authentication technologies at the
point of dispensing and based on 2D Data Matrix codes
may be efficient and reliable in detecting counterfeit drugs
in the supply chain. However, the establishment of a strong
infrastructure linking all pharmacies to an information
system requires time and effort in addition to high costs
and resources, which would pose a huge challenge for low-
and middle-income countries. Despite the high start-up
costs of such a system, one modeling study suggested it
could be cost-effective in the long run. Nonetheless, all
included studies on product authentication systems were
executed as part of pilot tests, thus their operation in real
settings and their effects in the long run could not be
established.
Pharmacovigilance systems seem to be growing at fast
pace in low- and middle- income countries to promote drug
safety and allow routine post-marketing surveillance of
pharmaceuticals at the national level. These systems have
been able to detect a host of counterfeited and substandard
drugs at the national level. To enhance their chances of
success, it is critical to tackle the issue of underreporting
that would arise, as well as ensure ongoing training,
monitoring, and feedback. Importantly, interventions to
strengthen the legal framework and structures for phar-
macovigilance activities as well as improve the coordina-
tion of stakeholders countrywide should be undertaken
before the national pharmacovigilance system is capable of
collecting its own data, generating indicators, evaluating
drug-related risks, and eventually serving as a genuine tool
for public health [37].
The findings on raising awareness and educating the
general public on the danger of counterfeit drugs from
illicit drug outlets supported their potential to promote
changes in purchasing behaviors and reach the target
audiences. Nonetheless, better results could have been
achieved by utilizing broader sets of media channels,
including effective social media communications, as well
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as ensuring comprehensive and dedicated content on the
issue. One of the authors also recommended recruitment of
trainers to design and regularly monitor the content of the
messages to avoid distortion, as well as better elaboration
on the prices of drugs in the key messages given the
commonly held belief that drugs from illicit outlets are
cheaper, and thus more appealing to the public [22].
Although the previous systematic review did not address
online drug counterfeiting, it is widely acknowledged that
illicit online drug outlets have fueled the global spread of
counterfeit and substandard medicine [8, 24]. Indeed,
previous reviews on this subject have only focused on the
quality of medicines purchased online, characteristics of
online web sites, online supply issues, consumer profiles,
and challenges of illicit online pharmacies [24, 43–45].
This current systematic review identified three eligible
studies that pointed to deficiencies in laws and regulations
addressing online pharmacies and online purchasing of
drugs as well as highlighted the potential of online edu-
cational platforms to reach individuals at risk and inform
them about purchasing drugs online. Despite the increased
recognition of the global challenges posed by the Internet
and illicit online pharmacies [5, 24], few solutions have
emerged to confront this problem. For instance, the USA,
passed the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2008, named after an 18-year-old boy who
died from an overdose of drugs purchased online. The law
mandates prescriptions for online purchases, but is limited
to controlled substances [46]. However, commentaries
have been critical about its effectiveness [24]. A few
studies have also found that verification schemes, seals,
and certifications of online pharmacies can be an important
step towards achieving online patient safety [47, 48].
4.2 Strengths and Limitations
Our systematic review complements the findings of the
review of effectiveness and provides the contextual evi-
dence for interpreting the findings. Such synthesis would
make an important contribution to understanding how
systems-level interventions work and the challenges that
may arise, taking into account the context of application.
Other strengths include pre-publishing a protocol, search-
ing multiple databases, and including both published and
unpublished studies to ensure the comprehensiveness of
our search. In addition, our systematic review responds to a
policy-relevant priority as identified by policymakers and
stakeholders.
A main limitation of this systematic review is that we
did not formally assess the risk of bias in each of the
included studies. Indeed, the majority of included studies
were descriptive country case studies. In addition, two of
the included studies on product authentication technology
were respectively designed [18] and funded [33] by phar-
maceutical industries, thus we could not eliminate the
possibility of reporting bias in favor of the technology.
Also, for some interventions, only a single study was
retrieved, limiting our ability to draw any reliable conclu-
sions. Another limitation relates to the fact that we only
included studies conducted in English, Arabic, or French,
thus we may have missed out on relevant articles written in
other languages.
4.3 Implications for Policy
Contextual factors are critical in shaping health system
decisions, and policymakers need to take these into con-
sideration to ensure the effective implementation and,
ultimately, the success of systems-level interventions to
combat or prevent drug counterfeiting.
Policymakers and stakeholdersmayconsider strengthening
the drug registration procedure and complementing it with
stringent post-marketing surveillance using ‘‘standard phar-
macovigilance methods of registration, analysis and investi-
gation’’ [36] to help identify counterfeit drugs as well as
sustain the quality of drugs circulating the market. Such reg-
ulatory measures could be further synergized by legal mea-
sures such as the establishment of counterfeit drug-specific
laws with a public health perspective, tough sanctions and
penalties, and non-legal measures such as the education of
judges, lawyers, and the public, as well as emphasizing the
important role of pharmacists in ensuring drug quality.
Importantly, they should ensure that legal and regulatory
measures also address the entire illicit online pharmacy
ecosystem for enhanced effectiveness. Indeed, without suit-
able harmonized legislation and cooperative agreements
between countries, ‘‘rogue’’ online pharmacies can bypass
stringent regulation by operating their web sites within juris-
dictions that have the least restrictive regulatory framework
[24].
Onsite quality inspections at different levels of the supply
chain could offer regulators in limited-resource settings with
an efficient and cost-effective intervention for preliminary
testing of large drug samples and increased regulatory vis-
ibility. This can be critical especially for countries with no
adequate national labs, since only the suspicious samples are
sent to the national lab for further testing (rather than the
whole batches). Nevertheless, establishing national labs
should be considered in the long run.
While the evidence for product authentication tech-
nologies suggests they may be efficient, reliable, and cost-
effective in the long run, the very high start-up costs that
these systems entail in terms of infrastructure and infor-
mation technology may serve as a barrier for implemen-
tation, particularly in low- and middle-income countries
where resources are scarce.
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Finally, policymakers and stakeholders may consider
investing in national public awareness and education initia-
tives using multiple platforms and disseminating compre-
hensive and dedicated content about the risks of purchasing
drugs from illicit outlets and the warning signs to look for.
4.4 Implications for Research
Despite the serious public health implications of drug
counterfeiting, there is still a dearth of methodologically
rigorous studies to assess interventions to combat or pre-
vent drug counterfeiting. Future research should address
the methodological limitations of existing studies, includ-
ing clear explanations of the sampling and recruitment
methods, as well as the use of reliable and valid data col-
lection tools. Also, more rigorous and objective studies
assessing the cost-effectiveness of the different systems-
level interventions should be considered, including product
authentication systems, which are increasingly being pro-
moted by international agencies for combating counterfeit
drugs. Furthermore, given the growing phenomenon of
online sales of drugs, it is critical to assess the effectiveness
of interventions aimed at regulating or preventing online
drug counterfeiting.
Finally, there is a need to standardize the definition of
what constitutes counterfeit drugs in order to establish
consistency when implementing interventions and com-
paring findings across different studies and settings.
5 Conclusion
Several factors are critical to the successful design and
implementation of systems-level interventions to combat or
prevent drug counterfeiting. We found some evidence on
the efficiency, reliability, cost-effectiveness, regulatory
visibility, acceptability, ability to detect counterfeit drugs,
and/or implementation considerations of a range of sys-
tems-level interventions. Policymakers need to take these
into consideration to ensure effective implementation and,
ultimately, the success of the interventions. Based on the
findings, strong regulatory measures, onsite quality control
and surveillance of drugs, national pharmacovigilance
systems, and educational and awareness initiatives on the
danger of illicit drug outlets seem promising. Regulatory
measures can be strengthened by minimizing drug diver-
sion, ensuring stringent post-marketing surveillance, and
placing equal emphasis on the different drug regulatory
functions. Deficiencies in laws and legislation include the
lack of counterfeit drug-specific laws, the lack of legal
statutes for online sale of drugs, insufficient legal and
administrative frameworks to criminalize fraudulent falsi-
fication of drugs, and poor enforcement capacity. Future
research should address the methodological limitations of
existing studies in terms of study design and data collection
tools. Also, more rigorous studies are needed to assess the
cost-effectiveness of the different systems-level interven-
tions, including product authentication systems and inter-
ventions targeting online drug counterfeiting.
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